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Graubard: Constitutional Law

NOTES
THE EXPANDED ROLE OF SCHOOL
ADMINISTRATORS AND GOVERNING
BOARDS IN FIRST AMENDMENT STUDENT
SPEECH DISPUTES: BETHEL SCHOOL
DISTRICT NO. 403 v. FRASER
I. INTRODUCTION

At the close of the 1986 Term the United States Supreme
Court issued an opinion which expanded the authority of school
administrators and governing boards in the area of first amendment student speech disputes. In Bethel School District No. 403
v. Fraser,l the Court held that school authorities could discipline
a student for giving a speech during a high school assembly
which contained a sexual innuendo. Bethel School District represents a new direction by the Supreme Court in analyzing stu. dent speech conflicts. The Court's opinion is a departure from a
protective first amendment analysis 2 to one which permits local
governing boards to set the standard in their own school
district. 3
1. 106 S.Ct. 3159 (1986).

2. See e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (1966». Tinker concerned the right of three high
school students to wear black armbands to school as a sign of their opposition to the war
in Vietnam. The Court's definition of speech included the symbolic statement of the
three students. Id. at 505. The Court said that students and teachers do not "shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Id. at
506. The Supreme Court held that the authorities may regulate the school environment
but the regulations must meet constitutional standards. The Tinker standard is usually
stated as a concern for whether the speech materially interfered with the educational
process. Id. at 509.
3. 106 S.Ct. at 3165. The Court said, "The determination of what manner of speech
in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school
board."
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In Bethel School District the Supreme Court majority held
that limits could be placed upon the content of student speech
considered to be indecent by school officials, even though the
school district had conceded that the statement did not meet the
legal test for obscenity" Prior to Bethel School District the Supreme Court's first amendment jurisprudence protected the content of speech, but allowed government to regulate conduct
through procedural time, place and manner regulations. 6 Although the Supreme Court has considered other aspects of first
amendment disputes within the schools in the past few years,S
Bethel School District is the first United States Supreme Court
opinion to evaluate the content of student speech and to place a
limit on first amendment rights since Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District 7 was decided in 1969.
In Bethel School District the Court employed a balancing
test to evaluate content. The nature of the institution and government's objectives in regulating that institution were balanced
against the first amendment rights of the individual,8 The Supreme Court concluded that it was within the school board's
powers to determine "what manner of speech in the classroom or
in school assembly is inappropriate. liD
4. See Fraser v. Bethel School District No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1361, n.5 (9th Cir.
1985). See also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1975) for the Court's legal definition
of obscenity. The Court's definition is whether an average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the description of sexual conduct (i) appeals
to the prurient interest in sex; (ii) portrays sex in a patently offensive way; and (iii) does
not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
5. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) and Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92 (1972); in both of those cases the Court invalidated breach of the peace statutes.
The Supreme Court held that the disputed ordinances were content based and impermissible under the first amendment. The right of government to enact procedural regulations was upheld. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). The Supreme
Court held that speech advocating an unpopular point of view was protected by the first
amendment unless the speaker's words incited "imminent lawless action." [d. at 449.
6. See, e.g., Board of Education v. Pico, 757 U.S. 853 (1982) (removal of library
books from a school library); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (public forums and
equal access to religious groups at a state university); Bender v. Williamsport School
Dist., 106 U.S. 1326 (1986), meeting of high school students' religious club on campus.
7. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
8. 106 S.Ct. at 3164. The Court said, "The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced against the society's countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate
behaviour."
9. 106 S.Ct. at 3165.
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The Court's opinion represents an expansion of a "school
law exception" restricting students' constitutional rights within
the public school setting.lO The Court has given school officials
more restrictive authority based upon the particular nature of
the institution and the need for discipline in the schools. l l By
employing a balancing test the Court has avoided stating a legal
definition to measure future first amendment disputes between
students and administrators. The facts of each particular dispute will have to ,be evaluated and weighed. The emphasis on
the special setting and the Supreme Court's utilization of a balancing test represents a shift in emphasis concerning the governance of the schools and of constitutional rights within the
schools.
II.

BACKGROUND

The dispute in Bethel School District concerned a nominating speech Fraser made on behalf of a classmate during a high
school assembly convened to hear candidates for student office.
Fraser's speech contained a metaphor about male sexuality. 12
After the assembly, the school district charged him with violat10. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). The Court upheld a school law
exception in the fourth amendment area. The Court held that evidence of drugs and
money was admissible when school authorities had "reasonable cause" to conduct a
search. The holding was a departure from the probable cause standard. In arriving at its
holding, the Court balanced " ... the school-child's legitimate expectations of privacy
and the school's equally legitimate need to maintain an environment in which learning
can take place." [d. at 340. The Court based its exception on the school setting. The
Court rejected the in loco parentis doctrine that school officials act in place of parents
during school hours, and therefore have parental powers which are not subject to constitutional restraints. The Court affirmed that school authorities were subject to constitutional considerations and cited Tinker for that proposition. However, the Court gave to
school authorities expanded control as state officials in the fourth amendment area.
11. 106 S.Ct. at 3166 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)).
12. Fraser v. Bethel School Dist., 755 F.2d at 1357. The following was Fraser's nominating speech:
I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his character
is firm-but most of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm. Jeff Kuhlman is
a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take an issue and nail it to
the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts-he drives hard, pushing and pushing until
finally-he succeeds.
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end-even the climax, for each and everyone of you.
So vote for Jeff for ASB vice-president-he'll never come
between you and the best our high school can be.
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ing its disruptive conduct rule and suspended him for three
days.13
Fraser was an honor student and a member of the debate
team. He had received the "top speaker" award in statewide debate championships for the past two years. At the time the
speech was made he was a graduating senior. As part of the disciplinary action imposed on him, the school district removed his
name from a list of candidates who were to be on the ballot for
graduation speaker.
Fraser filed suit in federal district court with his father as
guardian ad litem and charged a violation of his civil rights
under 42 U.S.C. section 1983,.· claiming that the Bethel School
had abridged his freedom of speech as protected by the first and
fourteenth amendments. III The United States District Court
ruled in his favor, issued a declaratory judgment, and awarded
him $12,750 in costs and attorneys fees!6 The court also issued
an injunction enjoining the school district from preventing Fraser from participating as a commencement speaker in the graduation exercisesP
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court, and went on to hold that Fraser's
speech was not materially disruptive to the educational process
as required by Tinker v. Board of Education!8 Under Tinker
the school district was required to offer evidentiary proof that
there was a material disruption in order to justify its disciplinary action. The Court of Appeals also held that the school district could not discipline him for speech which the authorities
considered to be indecent. The court noted that the school dis13. Id. at 1357 n.l. The rule, which was published in the school's student handbook,
stated:
In addition to the criminal acts defined above, the commission of, or participation in
certain noncriminal activities or acts may lead to disciplinary action. Generally, these are
acts which disrupt and interfere with the educational process.
Disruptive Conduct. Conduct which materially and substantially interferes with the
educational process is prohibited, including the use of obscene, profane language or
gestures.
14. Id. at 1358.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 393 U.S. 503.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol17/iss2/3

4

Graubard: Constitutional Law

1987]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

261

trict had conceded that the speech was not legally obscene,19 in
which case it would have been outside of first amendment protection. The court reasoned that the first amendment standard
under Tinker required a test of material disruption and not
"inappropriateness. "20
The Ninth Circuit discussed the district court's evidentiary
findings and noted that the only evidence presented by the
school district to support its contention that the speech materially disrupted the assembly was the testimony of one counselor.
He said that only three students, sitting on different sides of the
auditorium, indicated any overt response to the speech. The majority for the Ninth Circuit determined, based upon the testimony of the school counselor, that "the reaction of the student
body 'was not atypical to a high school auditorium assembly' "21
and thus was not disruptive.
The only other evidence presented by the school district
was the testimony of a home economics teacher, who said that
during class the next day her students expressed so much interest in Fraser's speech that she devoted approximately ten minutes to a discussion of it. 22 The majority for the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the school district had failed to prove that Fraser's speech materially interfered with the educational process as
required by Tinker.23
The Ninth Circuit rejected the school district's argument
that it could discipline Fraser because the speech was made at a
school-sponsored function. The school district had argued that
the student audience was a "captive" audience, and therefore
the authorities had an obligation to protect the students from
indecent speech.24 The Ninth Circuit did not accept the argument. The court distinguished between unwanted intrusions into
the privacy of the home, and the public nature of a high school
assembly.21!
19. 755 F.2d at 1361 n.5.
at 1361.
at 1359-1360.
at 1360.
at 1359.
24. For its captive audience argument the school district relied upon Federal Com·
munications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). See note 31.
25. 755 F.2d at 1362-1363.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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III. THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS OF BETHEL
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 403 v. FRASER
The United States Supreme Court came to a different conclusion than the Court of Appeals based upon the evidentiary
record. 26 The Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that the
school district had the authority to regulate student speech it
considered to be indecent. 27
The majority opinion was delivered by Chief Justice Burger.
He found the facts of this case to be distinguishable from the
symbolic speech dispute in Tinker.28 Tinker concerned the right
of three high school students to wear black armbands to school
as a sign of their opposition to the war in Vietnam. The majority
asserted that the first amendment protection afforded to the
students in Tinker did not apply to the facts of the Bethel
School District dispute. In evaluating the content of both statements the Court differentiated between the political statement
in Tinker and Fraser's campaign speech. The Court determined
that greater first amendment protection should be afforded to
the symbolic political speech in Tinker than to Fraser's speech.29
26. There is a disagreement as to how disruptive and disturbing Fraser's speech was.
The Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals came to different cunclusions based upon
the evidence.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the testimony of the high
school counselor and home economics teacher was not enough evidence.
The Supreme Court majority concluded that "the speech could well be seriously
damaging to its less mature audience, many of whom were only 14 years old and on the
threshold of awareness of human sexuality. Some students were reported as bewildered
by the speech and the reaction of mimicry it provoked." 106 S.Ct. at 3165.
Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion stated that there was no evidence in the
record to indicate that any student either male or female found the speech "insulting."
[d. at 3168 n.2.
Justice Marshall, dissenting, also found that the school district had failed to present
sufficient evidence that the speech was disruptive. [d. at 3168-3169.
Fraser, in an interview given shortly after the Supreme Court opinion was issued
said, "In a lower court, a nurse from another school district testified that if she had been
in the audience, which she wasn't, and if she had been 14 years old, she would have been
upset by my speech. Distorting this testimony, Chief Justice Burger stated that 14 year
old girls were extremely upset by the speech." L.A. Daily J., July 18, 1986, § 1, at 4, col.
3.

27. 106 S.Ct. at 3163.
28. See supra note 2 for the Tinker standard.
29. Justice Burger said, "The marked distinction between the political 'message' of
armbands in Tinker and the sexual content of respondent's speech in this case seems to
have been given little weight by the Court of Appeals." 106 S.Ct. at 3163.
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Chief Justice Burger's opinion was supported by two earlier
United States Supreme Court opinions which had permitted
government intervention to protect minors from indecent speech
and indecent publications. In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation 30 a
plurality held that indecent speech which was not legally obscene could be regulated when broadcast over the radio. 31 In
Ginsberg v. State of New York 32 the Court affirmed the government's power to enact legislation which protected minors from
"harmful" publications. 33
The Court's opinion in Bethel School District was based
upon the idea that the function of public education is to prepare
30. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
31. Justice Stevens delivered the plurality opinion in Pacifica. The Court held that
indecent speech (a twelve·minute monologue titled "Filthy Words") could be regulated
because it was broadcast over the airwaves. A man who was driving in his car with his
son heard the broadcast which was aired in the afternoon. He filed a complaint with the
F.C.C. The F.C.C. ruled that the broadcast was indecent. The Supreme Court plurality
reasoned that the broadcast reached listeners in the privacy of their homes, where some
might be unwilling, and thus a "captive" audience. The Court also reasoned that the
broadcast could reach children who were too young to read, were not in school, and who
had no control over what they might be hearing. The plurality opinion concluded that it
was within the F.C.C.'s power to regulate speech which was not legally obscene. The
plurality put forth a theory that there could be a hierarchy placed upon the value of
speech with varying degrees of constitutional protection. [d. at 746.
32. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
33. Ginsberg was convicted under a statute of selling a pin.up magazine, which was
"harmful to a minor," to someone under the age of 17 years old. The question of whether
the magazine was legally obscene was not before the Court. However, the Court noted
that "obscenity is not within the area of protected speech or press." [d. at 634 (citing
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476). The Court held that the statute could be drafted so
that it was more restrictive in allowing minors access to the publication than it would be
to adults. They held that this diu not abridge a minor's constitutional right to freedom
of expression.
The Court's justification for finding a violation, even though it was not a crime to
sell the publication to adults, was that "the concept of obscenity or of unprotected mat·
ter may vary according to the group to whom the questionable material is directed or
from whom it is quarantined." [d. at 636.
The Court reasoned that it was within the State's power to enact health and safety
legislation for the well·being of its children. They affirmed the New York statute on
rational basis grounds, finding obscenity to not be protected speech requiring a height·
ened level of scrutiny.
In Ginsberg, the Court affirmed government's role to enact legislation which pro·
tected minors from "harmful" publications. The court indicated that there could be lim·
its which would not invade "the area of freedom of expression constitutionally secured to
mihors." [d. at 637. In Pacifica and Ginsberg the Court permitted limits on first amend·
ment expression where speech was of a lesser value than "core political speech," and
when it was within the legislative powers of government to enact rules for the well being
of its children.
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students "for citizen::.hip in the Republic. . . ."34 The majority
asserted that the schools must teach the social values of a democracy which include "habits and manners of civility as values
in themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to
the practice of self-government in the community and the nation."3& The Supreme Court majority gave great deference to the
local school board and to the societal values which members of it
hold as political representatives. 36
The Court's opinion is that the school's function to teach
social values encompasses regulation of speech which school administrators find offensive. The majority noted that the Manual
of Parliamentary Procedure drafted by Thomas Jefferson prohibited the use of impertinent or indecent speech in the House
of Representatives. 37 Thus, even if Fraser's speech was a political speech, Fraser's choice of words would not have received first
amendment protection under Jefferson's guidelines because of
its content.
The Court noted that support for the authority of the Governing Board to regulate student speech disputes could be found
in Ambach v. Norwick. 3s In Ambach the Supreme Court held
that a New York state statute prohibiting any person who was
not a citizen of the United States from teaching in the public
school system did not violate the equal protection clause of the
United States Constitution. The Court found no constitutional
violation and affirmed the state statute on rational basis
grounds. 3s Ambach was one of a line of cases in which the Supreme Court established a "public employee" exception40 to judicial review at the strict scrutiny level when alienage was a
characte7istic of the disputed classification.
34. 106 S.Ct. at 3164 (quoting C. Beard & M. Beard, New Basic History of the
United States 228 (1968)).
35. Id. at 3164.
36. [d. at 3165.
37. Id. at 3164.
38. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
39. [d. at 76-77, citing Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978). The Supreme Court
reasoned that there could be a "public employee" exception because teachers participate
in a governmental function which includes teaching students about citizenship and the
administration of government.
40. [d. at 76-77 (citing Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
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The majority cited Ambach for the proposition that education may be government's most important function, in part, because it teaches the cultural values of a democracy. The Supreme Court held in Ambach that since teachers play a critical
role in this process, United States citizenship could be required
of them.
The Court found additional support for the expanded
school board authority in a first amendment dispute in Board of
Education v. Pica, a United States Supreme Court opinion decided during the 1982 Term.41 A school board had evaluated the
content of library books and ordered some removed because
they were considered indecent. In Pica, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that "local school boards have broad discretion in the management of school affairs."42 In Bethel School
District the Court observed that, although the Pica decision was
a plurality opinion, all of the Supreme Court justices agreed that
a local governing board had the authority to remove books from
a school library which the board members considered to be
vulgar. 43
In Pica the emphasis was on the local board's authority to
censor the content of books which its members considered indecent. In Bethel School District the Supreme Court permitted
the governing board to censor speech which its members considered indecent. The Supreme Court's legal standard in these
opinions is not protective of content, but rather gives deference
to community standards which may vary from one locale to
another.
The Court rejected Fraser's argument that the school's disciplinary action violated his right to procedural due process of
notice and a right to a hearing." The Court reasoned that the
school's disciplinary conduct rule and the advance warning from
41. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
42. [d. at 863 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1925)).

43. 106 S.Ct. at 3165 (citing Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871-872
(1982) (plurality opinion)); [d. at 879-881 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Id. at 918-920
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The books which were the subject of the dispute were:
Slaughter House Five, The Naked Ape, Down These Mean Streets, Best Short Stories
of Negro Writers, Go Ask Alice, Laughing Boy, Black Boy, A Hero Ain't Nothing But a
Sandwich, Soul on Ice, The Fixer. Id. at 856 n.3.
44. 106 S.Ct. at 3166.
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two of his teachers that he might be subject to sanctions was
adequate notice. In Bethel School District the Court affirmed
the school law exception it had articulated in its last term in
New Jersey v. T.L.D.,45 and said that the constitutional rights of
students in the school setting was not "automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings."46
In Bethel School District the Supreme Court reasoned that
deference should be accorded to the local governing board so
that it had enough authority to run the schools. The Court emphasized the distinction between political speech which was protected and speech which was not protected. The Court distinguished the symbolic speech dispute in Tinker from indecent
speech which would not receive first amendment protection in
the schools. Chief Justice Burger said, "[a]s cogently expressed
by Judge Newman, 'the First Amendment gives a high school
student the classroom right to wear Tinker's armband, but not
Cohen's jacket.' "47 Cohen was convicted of disturbing the peace
in the Los Angeles County courthouse. He wore a jacket which
had an epithet on it expressing opposition to the draft. The
United States Supreme Court reversed his conviction. The Court
found Cohen's speech to be protected by the first amendment.
The Court held that it expressed his own opinion and there was
no intent to disrupt. 48 In Bethel School District the Supreme
Court concluded that Fraser's sexual metaphor was not a politi45. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). See supra note 10.
46. 106 S.Ct. at 3164.
47. [d. at 3164-3165 (citing Thomas v. Board of Education, Granville Central School
District, 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (CA 2 1979) (opinion concurring in result). Thomas concerned a dispute over a student produced off-campus newspaper which was alleged to be
indecent. The court held that administrators could not punish students for off-campus
activities. The court never reached the issue as to whether the publication was indecent.
The concurring opinion discussed whether or not the publication was protected by the
first amendment. The concurring opinion concluded that the authoritills could regulate
indecent speech which was not obscene. He said, "School authorities can regulate indecent language because its circulation on school grounds undermines their responsibility
to try to promote standards of decency and civility among school children." [d. at 1057.
48. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). In Cohen the Court held that the
statute under which Cohen was tried was too vague, and it didn't identify the interests
which the state wished to limit. The Court asserted a high standard for government to
meet. They said, "The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut
off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is, in other words, dependent upon a
showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable
manner. Any broader view of this authority would effectively empower a majority to
silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections." [d. at 21. In Cohen the
Supreme Court concluded that anyone who was offended could look away or continue
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cal statement and therefore it was not constitutionally
protected. 49
Justice Brennan wrote a separate concurring OpInIOn in
Bethel School District. He reasoned that under the facts of this
case the school district's disciplinary action was permissible because of its authority to govern the schools. IIO He distinguished
between the level of first amendment protection which the Court
gave to a statement which authorities considered to be indecent
within the schools and outside of them. Brennan concurred with
the majority's emphasis on the special setting of the school environment. He noted that Fraser's speech did not meet the legal
test for obscenity. He reaffirmed the Supreme Court's holding in
Cohen, and said that government could not prohibit Fraser's
statement as inappropriate in a non-school setting. III
Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, maintained that
the school faculty could regulate the content of some speech, as
long as the student involved received fair notice. He did not believe Fraser had received fair notice, however.1I2 Justice Stevens
favored a strong presumption in favor of protected first amendment expression,1I3 and went on to argue that, based upon the
evidence in the record, Fraser's speech was not prohibited by the
school's own disciplinary rules which required that it must have
caused a material disruption. 1I4 Justice Stevens acknowledged
that Fraser was a good student who was respected by his peers.1II!
He noted that there was no evidence in the Court of Appeals'
record to indicate that any of the students found the speech offensive. 1I6 He said that the dispute might, in part, be generational and that the students might be a better judge of contemporary standards "than is a group of judges who are at least two
generations and 3,000 miles away from the scene of the crime."117
walking, and that the courthouse was a public place which did not guarantee freedom
from unwanted intrusion.
49. 106 S.Ct. at :3164.
50. [d. at :3167-:3168 (Brennan, J., concurring).
51. [d. at 3167.
52. [d. at :3169 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53. [d. at 3172.
54. [d. at 3170.
55. [d. at 3169.
56. [d. at 3169 n.2.
57. Id. at 3169.
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Stevens concluded that if the Supreme Court was going to defer
to local community standards then the 'Court should defer to the
federal district court and Court of Appeals which had found the
speech to be protected. tl8
Justice Marshall also dissented. He alone would have affirmed the lower court's finding that there was no material disruption of the educational process as required by Tinker.tl9
IV. CRITIQUE
In Tinker the Supreme Court held that the United States
Constitution applied to students attending public schools. The
first amendment right to freedom of speech was held applicable
to the schools through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 8o Since the Supreme Court issued the Tinker decision in 1969, it has measured student speech disputes by that
standard. The rule has been that speech is protected by the first
amendment unless the authorities can prove that it "materially
and substantially interferes with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the schools. "61
The Tinker court affirmed the authority of school officials
to govern the schools. 82 However, the Court said, "[o]ur problem
lies in the area where students in the exercise of First Amendment rights collide with the rules of the school authorities. "63
The Tinker court cited Epperson v. Arkansas 64 for the following
rule concerning the level of judicial review to be accorded a dispute within the public school system: "By and large, public education in our nation is committed to the control of state and
local authorities. Courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school
systems and which do not directly and sharply implicate basic
58. [d. at 3172.
59. [d. at 3168-3169 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
60. 393 U.S. at 507 (citing West Virginia v. Barnette, :119 U.S. 624, 637 (1943), in
which the Court said, "The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures-Boards of Education not
excepted").
61. 393 U.S. at 509.
62. 393 U.S. at 507.
63. [d. at 507.
64. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
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constitutional values. "6~ In Tinker the Supreme Court held that
the authorities may regulate the school environment; however,
the regulations must meet constitutional standards. 66 This rule
was very protective of content. It regulated conduct but did not
censor ideas. In Tinker the Supreme Court concluded that the
students' symbolic expression did not interfere with the work of
the schools or interfere with the rights of other students. 67 The
Supreme Court held, "[i]n the absence of a specific showing of
constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students
are entitled to freedom of expression of their views."68
In the years since Tinker was decided, the federal courts
have had occasion to rule on student speech disputes. If a court
found that the dispute involved protected rights, a first amendment analysis utilizing the Tinker standard was applied. 69 If a
court found that constitutional rights were not involved deference was given to the local governing body.70 In some instances
the courts have held that school authorities violated first amendment rights. In other instances, the courts have found that the
authorities acted within their governmental powers and no constitutional violation was found.
Although the circuits have not always been consistent, it is
possible to extract some principles from their holdings. In conflicts which concerned student newspapers, most of the courts
have followed Tinker and held that student speech was protected unless the school district could present a compelling justification for its restriction. An opinion by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit distinguished between
student speech made within the context of a school-sponsored
public forum to which the Tinker standard applied, and a stu65. 393 U.S. at 104. The Supreme Court struck down a state statute prohibiting the
teaching of the theory of evolution in the public schools. The Court held that the statute
violated the first and fourteenth amendments. Although this opinion affirms judicial intervention when constitutional values are at stake, it is often cited for the proposition
that the Court will not interfere with government's legitimate authority to administer
the schools.
66. 393 U.S. at 513.
67. 393 U.S. at 508.
68. 393 U.S. at 511.
69. See note 72.
70. See notes 71, 73, and 74.
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dent newspaper which was produced in a journalism class which
authorities could regulate. 71
The courts have ruled that once school authorities allow a
public forum to develop, it must be accessible to all students.72
When there are health and safety considerations deference has
been given to the school's regulations. 73 Similarly, when there is
a concern for the age of the students, and in order to avoid psychological harm because of their relative immaturity, school regulations will be upheld. 74 A federal district court held that privacy concerns for students and their families was within the
school district's domain. 71i That decision was reversed by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and is
presently pending before the United States Supreme Court.76
71. See Nicholson v. Board of Educ., 682 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1982). Pre-publication
review of a journalism class produced school newspaper was upheld. The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the right of school authorities to exert their control over matters which involved
the school curriculum. The court reasoned that since the publication was an integral part
of the curriculum the school district could exert more control over it. [d. at 863-864.
72. See Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977). The
court held that a student newspaper was established as a public forum and entitled to
first amendment protection. The school board appealed a district court order enjoining it
from prohibiting publication of a student article about birth control. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
See Zuker v. Panitz, 299 F.Supp. 102 (S.D. N.Y. 1969). A federal district court held
that the school district could not prohibit publication of an advertisement in a school
newspaper opposing the war in Vietnam because it was a public forum and there had
been other articles about the war and the draft in it.
See San Diego Comm. v. Governing Bd., 790 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir. 1986). High school
newspaper was a public forum and the school could not prohibit publication of an advertisement from plaintiff organization opposing draft registration.
73. See Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1980). School district could
prohibit distribution of a student produced off-campus newspaper which contained advertisement for the sale of drug paraphernalia.
74. See Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925
(March 20, 1978). School district could prohibit distribution of a questionnaire about sex
to ninth and tenth graders because of their age. However, it could be distributed to
eleventh and twelfth graders. The results were to be published in the student
publication.
75. See Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 607 F.Supp. 1450 (D.C. Mo. 1985).
The federal district court held that two pages could be deleted from a student newspaper. The articles concerned teen pregnancy and divorce. The district court reasoned that
privacy concerns for the students and their families was a compelling justification for not
publishing the articles.
76. See Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986), cert.
granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3493 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1987) (no. 86-836). The Court of Appeals held
that the student newspaper was a public forum and "a conduit for student viewpoint."
The court held that the deletion of the articles violated the students' first amendment
rights.
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Allegations concerning indecent speech have been decided both
ways.77
In Bethel School District the Supreme Court announced a
legal standard to measure student speech disputes which differed sharply from the Tinker approach. The court employed a
balancing test that weighed and evaluated the content of the
speaker's words against the government interest in prohibiting
the speech.78
The majority in Bethel School District did not utilize the
Tinker analysis to measure whether the speech had a material
disruption on the educational process. The majority disregarded
the findings of both the federal district court and the United
States Court of Appeals that the speech was not disruptive. The
Supreme Court also declined to consider the public forum issues
of the dispute which were discussed by the lower court,79 and
which have traditionally been part of a first amendment
analysis. 80
Instead, the majority evaluated the content of Fraser's
speech and distinguished between the political message of the
Tinker armbands and the sexual content of Fraser's statement. 81
The Court did not define political speech except by analogy to
77. See Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444
U.S. 1081 (1980). Student newspaper published off-campus which contained articles of
sexual satire was considered indecent by the school board. The students who published it
were suspended for five days and sought injunctive relief. The Court of Appeals held
that the students could not be disciplined because the activity took place outside of
school. The court did not reach the issue of indecent speech. See supra note 47.
See Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1981). The court held that the school
district did not violate the first amendment when it cancelled a play, "Pippin," because
of its sexual theme. The court reasoned that although participation in the play was voluntary, it was considered a part of the theater arts curriculum and was within the school
board's authority.
78. 106 S.Ct. at 3164.
79. 755 F.2d at 1365.
80. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981), where the Supreme Court said
that in order to justify exclusion of a student religious club from a state university the
authorities must "show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." The Court held that the university had created a forum open to student groups and that the religious club should also
be allowed to meet on campus.
See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). Sidewalks outside of school
were limited public forum and may be closed if they disrupt school while it's in session.
81. 106 S.Ct. at 3163.
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Tinker. Without a legal definition from the Court, distinguishing
the political from the indecent presents a problem for analyzing
future disputes. Sometimes a statement may be both - as the
Supreme Court held in Cohen. 82 The standard becomes subjective and a matter of local community values without a definition
from the Court. 83 In Bethel School District the Court has cre.ated an intermediate category of speech which neither meets its
legal definition of obscenity,84 nor receives the protection of the
first amendment.
In Bethel School District the Supreme Court concluded
that the authorities could discipline Fraser and prohibit his
speech not because it caused a material disruption as required
by Tinker, but because of the "school's basic educational mission. "86 The Supreme Court majority balanced the speaker's first
amendment rights against the school district's justification for
regulating the speech. The majority of the Court evaluated the
content of the statement and held that it was not appropriate
for that setting. 88 The Court considered the content of Fraser's
speech and expressed a judgment about its political value, rather
than considering the effect the speech had on the conduct of the
audience.

Bethel School District's Effect on Student Speech Statutes
In California there is an Education Code provision on the
student exercise of free expression. 87 The statute provides that
82. See supra note 48.
83. Shortly after this opinion was issued, Fraser discussed the Court's evaluation of
the content of his speech, and commented on the implication that the Court's opinion
could be used to censor ideas. He said, "The year after I graduated, for instance, the
school administration prevented students from performing 'Working', a play by Studs
Terkel, because it included a segment on prostitutes. But the play, based on live interviews, did not glorify prostitution; instead, prostitutes described how unfulfilling their
lives are."
"During my senior year, parents and some school board members tried to put a stop
to a performance of 'Jesus Christ Superstar.' The play was allowed to go on, but only
after acrimonious debate and a 3-2 vote on the school board." L.A. Daily J., July 18,
1986, § I, at 4, col. 3.
84. See supra note 4.
85. 106 S.Ct. at 3166.
86. [d. at 3166.
87. See Cal. Educ. Code § 48907 (West Supp. 1987). Student exercise of free expression. (Former § 48916, enacted by Stats. 1976, c. 1010, and formerly § 10611.)
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students in the public schools have the right to exercise freedom
of speech. Expression which is "obscene, libelous, or slanderous"
is prohibited. As is speech which disrupts "the orderly operation
of the school."
In 1975, the Legislative Counsel of California was presented
with a question concerning indecent student speech. Legislation
had been introduced to amend the Education Code provision on
student speech.88 The question presented was whether it would
be constitutional to require that the right to student exercise of
free expression specifically exclude profane or vulgar expression.
The Legislative Counsel's opinion concluded that school districts could not prohibit indecent speech unless it also met the
legal definition for obscenity, was libelous or caused a material
disruption. 89 The Legislative Counsel's opinion was based upon
the constitutional standard articulated by the Supreme Court in
Tinker and Cohen. Under the guidelines issued by the Supreme
Court in Bethel School District a different conclusion might be
reached if the same question was presented to the Legislative
Counsel today, because the Court has created an indecent
speech category for students which is based on a different legal
standard.
The disruptive conduct regulation adopted by the school
district in the State of Washington90 and the California student
speech statute are both based upon the Tinker standard. If an
indecent student speech dispute was to occur in California, the
California Education Code provision would offer no greater first
amendment protection to California students then the Bethel
School District's disruptive conduct regulation offered to Fraser.
88. Assembly Bill 207, 1974-1975 Cal. Regular Session. (The legislation was not
enacted.)
89. See Advisory Opinion of the Legislative Counsel of California, June 25, 1975.
The Legislative Counsel cited two federal circuit court opinions which concerned disputes about high school newspapers (Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.
1970), and Sullivan v. Houston Independent School Dist., 333 F.Supp. 1149 (1971), vacated 475 F.2d 1071 (1973), reh'g denied, 475 F.2d 1404 (1973». A United States Supreme Court opinion was also cited which held that a student could not be disciplined
for speech which a university considered to be indecent because of "conventions of decency." See Papish v. University of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667 (1973).
90. See supra note 13.
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The Balancing Test as Applied to Public Employment First
Amendment Cases

In Bethel School District the Supreme Court balanced the
student's first amendment right to express himself against the
school district's justification for prohibiting the speech. The
Court has utilized a balancing test to determine whether or not
speech was protected in first amendment cases concerning public employees. This was first articulated in Pickering v. Board of
Education. 91
In public employment cases the Supreme Court said that a
balancing test was needed to protect the employee's first amendment rights as a citizen balanced against the government employer's need to regulate the work environment. 92 The issue in
Pickering was whether a teacher's letter to the editor of a local
newspaper, which was critical of the school board, was protected
by the first amendment. The Supreme Court held that the
school district could not dismiss the teacher because he had a
first amendment right to speak on a matter of public concern. 93
In Pickering the Supreme Court balanced the interests of the
individual as a citizen commenting upon a public issue against
the interests of the state as employer. 94
In Pickering the Supreme Court concluded that the balance
weighed in favor of the employee's first amendment right of selfexpression. The Court gave some guidelines for evaluating future
conflicts. They reasoned that the employee's speech was protected by the first amendment because it did not interfere with
confidentiality or the need to maintain discipline in the work
environment. The statement was not libelous and it reflected a
difference of opinion about a matter of public concern. 91i
In Connick v. Myers,96 a more recent dispute between a
public employee and the government employer, the Supreme
Court held that the balance favored government. Myers was
91. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
92. [d. at 568.
93. [d. at 570.
94. [d. at 568.
95. [d. at 570.
96. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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employed as an Assistant District Attorney. She circulated an
in-house questionnaire concerning employment conditions. She
was ordered transferred to a different division and when she refused the transfer she was terminated. Myers charged that she
was terminated for exercise of protected speech. The Supreme
Court affirmed her discharge and held that the speech was not
protected because it was not about a matter of public concern. 97
In Connick the Supreme Court distinguished between
speech that concerned private matters (internal office complaints) and matters of public concern. 98 The Court said that
when an employee's statement was not about a matter of politicalor social concern ". . . government officials should enjoy
wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment. "99
In Connick, as in Pickering, the Court afforded more protection to speech about public issues. The Court referred to "the
hierarchy of first amendment values."loo Consequently, some
speech by public employees about their employer was found to
be more protected than other speech. The Court gave as its reason for emphasizing public issues a concern for first amendment
rights of political association and a fear of chilling those
rights. lol The Supreme Court concluded that Myers' speech was
not on a public matter and deferred to the employer's authority
to regulate the office environment. l02
In each of the public employee first amendment disputes
the Court evaluated the content of the speech, and, as a matter
of law, it determined whether government met its evidentiary
burden of proof for justifying its action. l03 As part of this individualized evaluation the Court gave consideration to the government employer's authority to regulate the work environment.
The Court said, "[w]hether an employee's speech addresses a
matter of public concern must be determined by the content,
97. [d. at 148.
98. [d. at 147-148.
99. [d. at 146.
100. [d. at 145.
101. [d. at 145 (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982)).
102. [d. at 154.
103. [d. at 148 n.7. "The inquiry into the protected status of speech is one of law,

not fact."
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form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole
record. "l04
In Bethel School District the Supreme Court used a balancing test to resolve a first amendment dispute between a student
and the school board. The majority evaluated "the content, form
and context" of Fraser's statement. The Supreme Court accorded greater deference to the school district's authority to regulate the school environment than to Fraser's first amendment
rights. The expanded governmental authority to regulate speech
was based upon the institution, the school setting. 1011 Whether or
not Bethel School District is limited to its particular facts remains to be seen. The Supreme Court has issued a new and different standard by which to measure first amendment disputes
in the schools which requires an individualized evaluation, similar to the balancing test used by the Court in the first amendment public employee cases.
V. CONCLUSION
Bethel School District, the Supreme Court's most recent
opinion on a first amendment dispute in the schools, and
Tinker, which was decided in 1969, represent a tension in the
Supreme Court's first amendment jurisprudence. In Tinker
there was a debate between the majority and Justice Black, who
dissented, as to the level of constitutional protection to be given
to student speech. Justice Black did not believe that students
had full constitutional rights and he affirmed the authority of
school officials to exert their control. 106 In many respects the Supreme Court's opinion in Bethel School District appears to support Justice Black's dissent in Tinker, limiting students' constitutional rights within the schools.
Bethel School District is the first Supreme Court opinion to
employ a balancing test to measure a student speech dispute. It
represents a departure from the Tinker standard. Instead, it follows a line of public employee first amendment cases, in which
the Court employed a balancing test to evaluate content. In the
104. [d. at 147-148.

105. 106 S.Ct. at 3166.
106. 393 U.S. at 526 ..
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public employee cases the Court has given greater first amendment protection to public speech concerning political issues. The
first amendment rights of the individual are balanced against
the governmental interest in prohibiting the speech. In Bethel
School District the Supreme Court majority concluded that Fraser's speech was indecent and not political, therefore it was not
protected by the first amendment.
Dicta in the opinion give more weight to local control of the
governing boards and to local community values. The Supreme
Court has expressed greater deference to the authority of administrators to manage the schools. This opinion does not represent
a bright line rule for practitioners. The facts of each particular
dispute will have to be evaluated and weighed. The rules will
develop out of subsequent interpretation of case law.
Phoebe Graubard*

• Golden Gate University School of Law, class of 1987.
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